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TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-INCLUSION IN GROSS ESTATE OF
TRANSFER BY WHICH SETTLOR RETAINED POWER TO TERMINATE-In 1928,

decedent established a trust giving his wife the income for her life, with a remainder
to his three children. Decedent, as co-trustee, retained power to pay portions of
the corpus to his wife and to change the trust on his approval of a written request
by his wife. When the estate challenged the commissioner's assessment of a tax
deficiency, the Tax Court,1 relying on the power to invade the principal, included
the trust corpus in the gross estate under section 8n(d)(2) of the I.R.C.,2 no
reduction being allowed for the wife's life estate since no method of evaluating it
was offered. On appeal to the circuit court of appeals,3 it was originally decided
that the value of the life estate should be excluded on proof of its value by appropriate probability tables. Later, on rehearing, held, the opinion of the Tax Court
affirmed. The entire trust was taxable because of the retention of the power to
amend. Had the right to invade the corpus, viewed by the court as a power to
terminate, been the only power retained, the value of the wife's life estate would

1
2

3

7 T.C. 705 (1946).
26 U.S.C. (Supp. 1947) § 8n(d)(2).
(C.C.A. 6th, 1947) 164 F. (2d) 959.

1 949

J

RECENT DECISIONS
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have been properly excluded. Du Charme's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, (C.C.A. 6th, 1948) 169 F. (2d) 76.
The 1936 Amendment to the Revenue Act of 1926 4 expressly provided that,
as to transfers after June 22, 1936, property transferred by a decedent subject
to a retained power to alter, amend, revoke or terminate, was to be included in
his gross estate.5 Section 8 I I ( d) ( 2) of the I.R.C. relating to transfers on or prior
to June 22, 1936, mentions only the power to "alter, amend or revoke," but the
Supreme Court has interpreted section 8 I I ( d) (I) as merely declaratory of the law prior to its enactment, so that the power of termination is also included in
section 8u(d)(2).6 The property subject to a power to terminate 7 is taxable
whether or not the grantor exercises the power for his own benefit,8 and even if
the settlor expressly excludes its exercise in his interest.9 Moreover, it is immaterial
whether the donor exercises the power in the capacity of settlor or trustee.10 The
power must be one to terminate contingencies to which the possession or enjoyment
of the beneficiaries is subject 11 and not merely one which accelerates the time of
enjoyment or regulates trivial and unimportant matters.12 The power to invade the
principal in the instant case permitted the distribution of any or all of the corpus
to the life tenant and a resulting diminution or extinguishment of the remainder
4

The revision, now included as 26 U.S.C. (Supp. 1947) § 8n(d)(1, 2), amending

§ 302{d) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L. 9, c. 27, was made by Congress in 1936
following the decision of White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98, 56 S.Ct. 66 (1935), which
avoided a determination of whether the power to terminate was included within the
power to alter, amend or revoke.
ii Prior to the 1936 amendment, the power to terminate would probably not have
been thought to come within the power to alter, amend or revoke. Helvering v. Helmholz,
296 U.S. 93, 56 S.Ct. 68 (1935).
6
Commissioner v. Holmes' Estate, 326 U.S. 480, 66 S.Ct. 257 (1946).
7
The power to terminate is here used to designate an acceleration in the distribution
of a trust to the beneficiaries, while the power to revoke is employed to indicate that the
settlor cad return the corpus to himself.
8
Commissioner v. Chase National Bank, (C.C.A. 2d, 1936) 82 F. {2d) 157;
Commissioner v. Hofheimer's Estate, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 149 F. (2d) 733.
9
Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 53 S.Ct. 45 (1933); Mellon v. Driscoll,
(C.C.A. 3d, 1941) n7 F. {2d) 477.
10
Estate of Moir v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 765 (1942); Welch v. Terhune,
{C.C.A. 1st, 1942) 126 F. (2d) 695; Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Driscoll, (C.C.A.
3d, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 152; Commissioner v. Newbold's Estate, (C.C.A. 2d, 1946)
158 F. (2d) 694.
11
Commissioner v. Holmes' Estate, 326 U.S. 480, 66 S.Ct. 257 {1946), 30 MINN.
L. REV. 306 (1946).
12
Theopold v. United States, (C.C.A. 1st, 1947) 164 F. (2d) 404; 46 MICH. L.
REv. 1001 (1948); Commissionerv. Hofheimer'sEstate, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 149 F. (2d)
733·
Where by state law the settlor, with the consent of all beneficiaries, may compel the
trustee to terminate the trust, a similar retained power of termination does not subject
the property to taxation. Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U.S. 93, 56 S.Ct. 68 (1935);
T.R. 105, § 81.20.

434

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

interest of the children. 18 Thus the decedent retained a power to terminate the
trust by accelerating payment of the remainder to his wife, and at least the value
of the remainder was includible in the gross estate. Since the wife's estate was not
subject to this power of termination, had it been the only power retained by the
settlor, only the value of the remainder would be included. However, the court
looks to the adjunctive power to amend and, interpreting it as a power of the
settlor to change either the life estate or the remainder, finds this sufficient of itself
to include the entire trust within the gross estate.

C. C. Grunewald, S.Ed.

18

7 T.C. 705 at 711 (1946).

